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There exists an adage which states that growth in technology often 
ou/paces growth in ethics. Perhaps nowhere is this better demonstrated 
than in the Vatican statement released on February 20, 1997: "The moment 
of fertilization marks the constitution of "a new organism equipped with an 
intrinsic capacity to develop itself autonomously into an individual 
adult. "' ) Four days later the world was stunned with the report that true 
cloning had been successfu lly carried out for the first time in a mammal.2 
Suddenly the Vatican, together with theologians and ethicists throughout 
the world, was faced with the poss ibility of having to discuss the 
beginnings of human life where the rubric of " fertilization" is no longer 
applicable. 
Researchers from Scotland reported that they had successfu lly 
cloned a sheep from an adu lt sheep somatic cell. The resulting cloned 
sheep, named Dolly, was now fully grown and genetically identical to the 
adult sheep from which the donor cell had been harvested. 3 
The degree of initial public response, as reflected in the media, was 
astonishing. This may have been due in part to the unexpected nature of 
the announcement. Indeed, several recent articles4 had proposed that true 
" body-cell cloning" was not poss ible. 
In spite of the fact that the world may have been caught so "off-
guard" to its announcement, cloning has been the subject of scholarly 
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writing and discussion for some time. In a remarkable example of 
prescience, the Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg wrote an essay on cloning 
in 1966 that described exactly the same technique recently reported from 
Scotland.s From the perspective of this paper the great value of 
Lederberg's article was that it prompted commentary and debate from 
among the theological community. 
Two Protestant theologians, Paul Ramsey and Joseph Fletcher, 
were particularly vocal in their response to the idea of " fabricated man .,,6 
Both Fletcher and Ramsey commented primarily on the issues of human 
agency and freedom, the relationship of man to mature, and the proper role 
of parenthood. In the end, however, they disagreed on whether cloning was 
morally permissible based primarily on the issue of embodiment and 
personhood. Fletcher argued that the person is something different from 
the body. In his view, the body did not count for much - it was an object to 
be mastered and manipulated for the sake of personal choices.7 His 
approach was also utilitarian, arguing that cloning was moral if it 
represented the "greatest good for the greatest number" or " maximized 
happiness."g In fact, Fletcher was so supportive of cloning that he favored 
the "biodesigning of parahumans or modified men - as chimeras (part 
animal) or cyborg-androids (part prosthesis). ,,9 Needless to say, such 
views, particularly from a theologian, injected a degree of science fiction 
hysteria into the cloning debate that persists until the present day.l o 
Ramsey, on the other hand, rejected the notion of a body-person 
dualism. He held to the hylomorphic theory of Aquinas and insisted that 
the person is "an embodied soul or an em·outed body." In regarding the 
sexual person "as the body of his soul as well as the soul of his body," he 
refused to reduce procreation to a technical accomplishment. He further 
rejected technologies that both expressed a dualistic account of our relation 
with our bodies, and that diminished or distorted what it means to be a 
parent. Ramsey worried that technological reproduction - and especially 
cloning - would tempt us to view a child as a human achievement rather 
than as a gift of GOd.11 Ultimately, for these reasons among others, he 
rejected cloning as morally impermissible . 
In 1971 , Leon R. Kass - again, well ahead of his time - describes 
the same cloning technique and goes on to present a detailed ethical 
analysis on cloning.1 2 In drawing from the writings of Ramsey, he 
expresses his concerns primarily in the areas of personal identity and 
individuality. The cloned person may experience serious concerns about 
his identity (distinctiveness) because he is an identical duplicate of another 
human being. Kass argues that each person has a right not to be 
deliberately denied a unique genotype. He sees this as being central to the 
idea of the dignity and worth of each human being - an idea rooted in the 
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Judeo-Christian tradition of each person ' s relationship to the Creator. 13 He 
goes on further to discuss cloning from the perspective of artificial 
reproductive techniques and in vitro fertilization - a technology in its 
infancy at the time. In this regard, his concepts range from the 
experimentation and discarding of embryos to the potential assault on the 
sanctity of marriage - an institution in which the pleasure of sex, the 
communication of love, and the desire for children find their ultimate 
fulfillment. 14 Like Ramsey, he ultimately expresses grave concerns 
regarding the moral permissibility of cloning. 
Richard A. McCormick is the contemporary theologian who has 
perhaps expressed the most thought on cloning. His concerns revolve 
around three central issues: life, wholeness, and individuality. The issue of 
life concerns him primarily in terms of the personhood of the pre-embryo. 
Is the pre-embryo a person? And, how much respect or protection needs to 
be afforded these entities at the beginning of human life. By wholeness 
McCormick refers to societal policies towards what is and is not acceptable 
or desirable now that genetic manipulation allows us to breed superior 
genotypes . His concerns regarding individuality center on whether a clone 
might lack the uniqueness or individuality that we deem essential to human 
worth and dignity. Further, how might this affect our wonder at human 
diversity and individuality?15 
The thoughts expressed by these theologians, in one way or 
another, all reflect concerns about how cloning will affect our views of 
individuality and personhood. 
In addition , cloning is essentially an artificial reproductive 
technique. With the promulgation of Donum Vitae in 1987, the 
magisterium explicitly set forth what was and what was not " licit" within 
the Church with regard to reproduction. Any reflection within the Catholic 
tradition on a new reproductive technology must be carried out in light of 
that document. 
Biological Considerations 
Cloning is qualitatively different from sexual reproduction as it 
occurs naturally, and - in the strictest sense - as it occurs artificially, in 
that the offspring's genome is identical with, and derived from, only one 
donor parent. 
There are several types of biological cloning that have been 
described in recent articles. 16 However, to some degree, it is a question of 
semantics as to what constitutes true cloning.17 Scientists and society have 
August, 1999 81 
never regarded twins as "c lones." Consequently, the use of the word to 
describe procedures that give ri se to identical twins is controversial. IS 
The process of true cloning, which has now been successfully 
achieved in mammals, involves a technique known as nuclear tran.~fer . 
There are two different cell types involved in nuclear transfer: an 
egg and a donor cell. In the experiments carried out at the Roslin Institute 
the donor cells were obtained from two sources: sheep embryos and adult 
sheep mammary tissue . In both cases the individual cells were harvested 
and then cultured and grown in vitro. Using micromanipulation techniques, 
an unfertilized egg is prepared by removing its nucleus. The nucleus is 
then removed from a donor cell and fused into the egg us ing an electrical 
current. The egg now contains a nucleus with the intact genome of the 
donor animal. The electrical current apparently also triggers the egg to 
begin development. The resulting pre-embryo is then tran sferred to the 
uterus of a recipient sheep and, from thi s point on, grows and develops as 
any other normal pregnancy. At birth, the newborn sheep is genetically 
identical to the donor animal. '9 The key difference in this type of 
reproduction is, of course, that the entire genetic identity comes from one 
parent as opposed to sexual reproduction in which it comes from both 
parents. 
In the case reported in February, 1997, from the Roslin Institute, 
the cloned sheep was the result of using somatic cells, specifically 
mammary tissue cells, from an adult sheep.20 This represents the first time 
that any mammal has been derived from adult cells. Although the nuclear 
transfer process is technically simple, it is as yet far from perfect in that it 
took 277 eggs with transplanted nuclei to produce one live lamb. Prior to 
the one successfu l result, severa l lambs were produced with varying 
degrees of deformities. 21 
To date, there have been no known reports of attempts to clone a 
human being using this technique of somatic cell nuclear tram.jer. Several 
western European countries, including the United Kingdom, have existing 
laws that ban attempts to clone human beings. Further, in the United 
States, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission has recommended that 
attempts to produce human beings by cloning be banned for a period of five 
years. 22 Under the commission ' s proposa l, scientists would be barred from 
implanting a cloned embryo into a woman ' s uterus. Such a ban, however, 
would not prevent privately-funded scientists from cloning human embryos 
solely for research and not implanted. Current federal rules prohibit 
federally-funded scientists from conducting any experiments using 
embryos.23 
82 Linacre Quarterly 
Human Cloning and Donum Vitae 
On July 25 , 1978, a child by the name of Louise Brown was born in 
Oldham, England. She was the product of the first successful pregnancy 
brought to full term that was the result of in vitro fertilization. Thus began 
the modem era of artific ial reproduct ive technologies.24 
Artificial reproduction (A R) refers to a number of di fferent 
technologies used to ass ist or, in some cases, to replace "normal" 
procreation. For the purposes of this paper, normal procreation would be 
defined as the conception of a child by normal sexual intercourse between 
the married parents of th~ child . 
The simplest fo rm of AR is art(jicial insemination (AI). There are 
two types of artific ial in semination: homologous when the husband ' s 
semen is used, and heterologous when a donor' s semen is used. These are 
referred to as AIH and AID respecti ve ly. Next up the scale of complexity 
is in vitro fertilization (IV F). In thi s technique the egg and sperm are 
harvested from the parents using va rious techniques. Fertilization then 
takes place by combining the egg and sperm in a laboratory dish. Once 
ferti lization has occurred, the pre-embryo is allowed to deve lop to the 
blastocyst stage. At this point, by a technique known as embryo transfer 
(ET), the pre-embryo i introduced into the uterus where implantation and 
subsequent deve lopment takes place. IV F can be perfo rmed using the egg 
and sperm of a married couple in which case it would be homologous or it 
can be performed using either the egg or sperm from a donor, in wh ich case 
it would be heterologous. 
There are also va riations among these techniques. For example, 
IV F, whether homologous or heterologous, can be used to produce a pre-
embryo which is subsequently transferred to the uterus of a surrogate 
mother. There is also a techn iq ue known as gamete intrafal/opian tramier 
(G IFT), in which both the egg and sperm are transferred to a site within the 
fa llopian tube in close prox imity to each other allow ing fe rtilization to 
occur within the body. Another methodology is low tubal ovum tram,fer 
(L TOT), in whi ch the egg is harvested and transferred below the site of an 
obstruction in the fallopian tu be thus a ll ow ing fe rtili zation to occur during 
normal sexual re lation .25 
To better deve lop thi s topic it is necessary to briefl y rev iew the 
Catho li c tradition dea ling with reproduction and conjuga l sexuality. 
It was the thought of St. Augustine that has perhaps most 
in flu enced the Church' s teaching on sexual ity and marriage. Augustine's 
vision of sexuality was undoubtedly influenced by his experiences with 
Manicheism.26 The body, in the dua li stic view of the Manicheans, was the 
work of the dev il. It fo llowed that the propagation of the body was evil. 
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Marriage, as the institutional means of procreation , was also seen as evil. 
Of interest is that sexual activity, so long as conception was avoided, was 
of little importance since it affected the body alone and not the spirit. To 
the Manichean argument that marriage was bad because procreation was 
bad, Augustine countered that it was precise ly the goodness of procreation 
which made marriage good. In his work De bono coniugali, Augustine 
more fully developed his thesis regarding the dominant concept that 
marriage was meant for procreation. In fairness to Augustine, he did 
expl icitly set forth that there are other ends to marriage besides procreation 
which also make it good. He insisted on the value of love between husband 
and wife, and how the ordo caritatis unites them when age or mi sfortune 
deprives them of children. He presented fidelity as an exchange of mutual 
respect and service, and insisted that .. the bodies of the married too are 
holy, when they keep faith to one another and to God ."n In spite of his 
being conscious of the value of these unitive aspects of marriage, Cormac 
Burke asserts that the doctrine of the in separable link of the unitive and 
procreative aspects of marriage developed later as a result of a canonical 
understanding of marriage .1X For Augustine it remained, "that married 
sexual intercourse is justified only if it is intended to be procreative, and 
has an element of imperfection or venial fault, if carried out solely for 
pleasure. ,,29 Aside from the influence of Augustine, many theologians 
today feel that the Church 's teaching regarding the prohibition against 
artificial reproductive techniques stems from the influence of Francis X. 
Hurth (1880-1963), a Jesuit and a leading moral theologian at the 
Gregorian University in Rome .. 'O Hurth argued that the moral law and the 
biological law coincide on these matters (conjugal sexuality): "This end for 
man thus is both the biological law and the moral law, such that the latter 
obliges him to live according to the biological law."" This "biologization" 
of what is essentially natural law theory is a theme that characterizes 
virtually all contemporary Church teachings in the area of sexuality and 
reproduction . 
Hurth's thesis was later adopted by Pius XII who, it could be said, 
was the impetus behind the contemporary magisterium ' s position. In 1949, 
in an address to Catholic physicians, Pius XII stated: 
84 
Artificial insemination outside of marriage is to be condemned 
purely and simply as immoral. 
Artificial insemination in marriage, but effected by means of 
the active element (semen) of a third party is . .. immoral and, as 
such, is to be summarily rejected . 
As for the morality of artificial insemination within marriage, 
let it suffice for the present to recall these principles of the natural 
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law: the simple fact that the des ired result is attained by this 
means does not justify the use of the means it se lf; nor is the des ire 
to have a child - perfect ly lawful as that is for married persons -
sufficie nt to prove the lic itness of art ifi cial insem ination to atta in 
the end .. '~ 
In 1951 , in an address to the Italian Catho lic Union of Midwives, 
Pius XII was more expl ic it in condemning artificia l in semination within 
marriage: 
Hence, .. . we fo rma lly exc luded art ifi cial insemination from 
marriage. 
This is much more than the mere union of two li fe-germs, 
which can be brought about also artitlcial ly, that is, without the 
natura l action of the spouses. The conjugal act. as it is planned 
and willed by nature, implies a personal cooperation, the right to 
which the parti es have mutually conferred to each other in 
contracting marri age ." 
Thi s natural law theory approach was perhaps most expl icitly 
stated by Paul VI in his encyc lica l HUfllunue Vitae ( 1968). Pa ul VI asse rts 
that "natura l law shows the in separable connection, willed by God and 
unable to be broken by human beings on their own initi ati ve, between the 
un itive and the procreati ve meaning of the sexual act.,,:q Thi s position, still 
firmly held by the magisterium, is the fundamental concept in 
understanding current Church teaching on artifi cial reprod ucti ve 
tec hnologies. If one accepts the thes is that the unitive-procreative 
fun ctions of marita l sex are inseparable, it then fo llows that artifi cial 
reproduction, since it removes proc reation from the sexua l act. would be 
illici t in the eyes of the Church. There are other ph ilosophica l and soc ial 
arguments used aga inst arti fic ial reprod uction and these wi ll be deve loped 
later in thi s paper. 
In 1987 the Congregat ion for the Doctrine of the Fa ith (CDF) 
released its Instruction on Respect for Human Life ill Its Orig in alld on the 
Dignity of Procreatio/l (DOIllIIII Vitae). It represents the most 
comprehensive statement of the Church on art ific ial reproductive 
technologies. As such, cloning, which is essenti a lly a reproductive 
technology, must be eva luated in light of its pos ition. Any va lid 
theo logica l refl ect ion on the subject, within the Catho lic tradition, must be 
done in re lation to that doc ument. 
In promul gating Domlln Vitae, the CDF establi shes from the onset 
that the natural law will be the mora l criteria on which its teaching is based. 
It quotes from HUlllanae Vitae: 
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The natural mora l law expresses and lays down the purposes, 
rights and duties which are based upon the bodily and spiritual 
nature of the human person. Therefore this law cannot be thought 
of as simply a set of norms on the biological level; rather it must 
be defined as the rational order whereby man is ca lled by the 
Creator to direct and regulate his life and actions and in particular 
to make use of his own body. }S 
The fundam ental pos ition of Doman Vitue in regard to procreation 
is that every pregnancy must occur within heterosex ual marriagt: and be the 
result of the conjuga l act between the husband and wife. J6 Thus, the 
critica l difference between natural and artificial reproduction is that in the 
latter the procreative event is severed from its natural re lationship to the 
sexua l union within a marriage. Artific ial reproduction establi hes "the 
dominion of technology over the ori gin and destiny of the human person .,,}7 
As such it gives the " life and idcntity of the embryo into the power of 
doctors and biologi sts ... ,,·'8 Consequently the di gnity of parents and child 
is lost. The Instruction is quitc clear in its judgment on the artificial 
reproducti ve technologies. The judgment is a rather c lear and 
unambiguous' No." This analys is re lies heav ily on the traditiona l natural 
law view of the nature of intercour c hav ing an inseparable proc reati ve and 
uniti ve dimension. There can, therefore, be abso lute ly no separation of any 
aspect of reproducti on. Consequcntly. the Instruction prohibits artificial 
in semination and in vitro fertili zation, whether homologous or 
heterologous. Further, it also prohibits cmbryo transfer, surrogate 
motherhood, cryopreservation of embryos, and most research on embryos 
and fetuses. J9 With regard to cloning, the Instruction states: 
... allelllpts O/' hypotheses.!; )/' ()htaining a human heing without 
an)' connection Il'ith sexuality through "twinjission. " cloning or 
parthenogenesis (Ire to he considered contrw:1' to natural 1£111'. 
since thel' are in oppositio/1 /IJ the dignity hllth of human 
procreation alld o/the sexu(/lul1i(}n~n (itali cs in original). 
It is clea r th at c loning. like all other artifi cial reproductive 
tec hniques that replace the conju ga l ac t. is considered illic it by the Church . 
However, not a ll the teachings of D O /llllII Vitae have been accepted by the 
theo log ica l community without reser ati on. Many theo logians view some 
type of artificial reprod uction not as su bstitutes fo r sexua l int imacy, but as 
a prolongati on of it. and therefore as not invo l ing the tota l everance of 
the uniti ve and the proc reative. McCormick agrees with thi s view and 
regards it as "a so lidly probable opinion ."~1 He asks, in regard to the 
meaning of the inse parabili ty of the uniti ve and procreati ve, whether these 
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must be held together in every act, or is it sufficient that the spheres be 
held together, so that there is no procreation apart from marriage, and no 
full sexual intimacy apart from a context of responsibility for procreation? 
As long as there is disagreement on these understandings, artificial 
reproduction will be as controversial as Pope Paul VI ' s encyc lical 
Humanae Vilae. 42 
Whatever the method used in artificial reproduction, it is whether a 
homologous or hetero logous technique is used that seems to be the critical 
factor among most ethicists and theologians regarding the acceptability of 
the procedure. 
In dealing with heterologous artificial reproductive techniques, the 
Church rejects them because, among other reasons di scussed. reproduction 
occurs outside marriage: 
Respect for the unity of marriage and for conjugal fidelity 
demands that the child be conceived in marriage; the bond 
exist ing between husband and wife accords the spouses, in an 
objective and inalienable manner, the exclusive right to become 
father and mother solely through in each. Recourse to the 
gametes of a third person in order to have sperm or ovum 
available constitutes a violation of the reciprocal commitment of 
the spouses and a grave lack in regard to that essential property of 
marriage which is its unity .. n 
Heterologous artificial fertili zation violates the rights of the 
child; it depri ves him of his filial relationship with hi s parental 
origins and can hinder the maturing of hi s personal identity.·14 
Most theo logians, whether Roman Catholic or not, have also 
rej ected hetero logous artificial reproducti ve techniques.45 Ral1l1er argues 
that donor techniques "fundamentally separate the marital union from the 
procreation of a new person:,·16 He further faults the anonymity of the 
donor, which represents a refusa l of responsi bility as a parent and an 
infringement on the ri ghts of the child. In short. there is little if any 
di sagreement between the Church and most theo logians on the 
unacceptab ility of donor artificia l reprod ucti ve tec hniques. There is. 
however, less agreement on the subj ect of homo logo LI S tec hniques. 
Many Catholic theo logians have defended homologolls tec hniques 
of artificial reproducti on:' 7 This view a lso find s widespread support both 
within the larger Chri stian community and in Judai sm.4x As director of the 
Center for Bioethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethi cs. LeRoy Walters 
surveyed 15 major bioethics committees throughout the world . These 
comm ittees unan imously agreed to the eth ical perm issi bi I ity of these 
tec hniques . These committees were not si mply pro-technology: 70% of 
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them rejected surrogate motherhood and as a whole they were just as 
protective of the human embryo older than 14 days as is the CDF.49 
Leaders of other Christian and Jewish communities have regularly reached 
conclusions roughly similar to those of these major committees.5o 
McCormick argues that since Vatican II has taught that the truth also 
resides in other Christian communities, "the Catholic Church, on its own 
terms, is irresponsible if it does not listen to and weigh seriously the 
experience and witness of other Christian bodies on moral questions.,,5 1 In 
tum, according to Vatican II, these "Christians are joined with the rest of 
men and women in the search for truth.,,52 
In contrast to the position of Donum Vitae that artificial 
reproduction is illicit because technology substitutes for sexual intercourse, 
there seems to be little basis in the literature or in experience for saying 
that love-making in either the sexual or nonsexual sense is displaced by 
technology in the recourse to homologous forms of reproduction . In fact, 
the record may be the opposite. Love-making in a marriage often suffers 
when there is infertility.53 McCormick summarizes the Instruction on this 
point: " In brief, when a child is ' conceived as the product of an 
intervention of medical or biological techniques, ' he cannot be ' the fruit of 
his parent's love.'" He then comments: "This is a non sequitur, and both 
prospective parents and medical technologists would recognize it as such. 
Sexual intercourse is not the only loving act in marriage.,,54 Interpersonal 
bodily intimacy is one kind. The creative hope for a child is another kind. 
Cooperation in important activities, such as would be required to go 
through homologous artificial reproduction, is still yet another. There are a 
myriad other elements of love within a marriage. Artificial reproduction 
does not "replace" any of these loves, nor need it replace sexual acts open 
. 55 to procreatton. 
Sidney Callahan and Lisa Sowle Cahill, both married women, insist 
that the proper starting point must be that whole which is the partnership of 
the married people - the starting point is not one genital act. For Callahan, 
"No 'act analysis' of one procreative period of time in a marriage can do 
justice to the fact that the reproductive couple exists as a unity within a 
family extended in time and kinship.,,56 
Many authors call for a greater use of experience in reflecting on 
these issues. The complexities of a marriage, as well as the outcomes of 
medical intervention, must be considered and not just an analysis of certain 
parts of an act. 57 
The instruction of Donum Vitae is thus considered by many 
theologians to be a form of biologism. That is, the biological structure of 
human procreation is so sacrosanct that it cannot be circumvented even 
when it is nonfunctional and leads to significant loss for the persons and 
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the marriage. 58 McCormick argues instead for an integral personalism that 
"goes beyond such biological givenness.,,59 He points to the criteria, 
proposed by Vatican II , to be used in judging the rightfulness or 
wrongfulness of human conduct: not "the intention of nature inscribed in 
the organs and their function," but " the person integrally and adequately 
considered .,,60 
Within this framework, under what, if any, circumstances could 
cloning be considered a reproductive technique or aid in marriage? 
Some might argue that cloning is not reproduction per se, but rather 
a form of self-replication . Shannon argues against this when he states that 
what is replicated in cloning is the genetic structure, not the individual.6 1 A 
cloned person would no more be the same individual as his or her parent 
than would an identical twin with his or her sibling. 
As a reproductive technique, cloning would qualify as a 
homologous form in the strictest sense. No biological material is required 
from either a spouse or a third party. 
Consider a s ituation, if and when cloning is established as an 
efficient and effective method of reproduction, where a married couple is 
unable to conceive because the husband has nonfunctional sperm or lacks 
them altogether. Likewise, consider a married couple in which one of the 
partners carries a dominant genetic trait that makes the likelihood very high 
of conceiving a child with a serious genetically transmitted disease. At the 
present time, the "solution" to such problems would be to consider a donor 
(heterologous) method of artificial reproduction . Such an action would 
find no support within official Catholic teaching and little if any support 
from most Catholic theologians. A traditional homologous technique 
would not be available - either the husband lacks healthy sperm or they are 
afraid to reproduce sexually for fear of conceiving a child with a serious 
illness. In such a situation, one of the parents could donate a somatic cell 
to allow nuclear tran sfer cloning to be performed. The child born of such a 
process would be genetically identical to the "donor" parent and the 
technique would be " homologous" in that no third party material was 
utilized. The child would be the genetic product of only one parent, but 
would also be the product of the married couple 's "creative hope for a 
child" and "cooperation" in the activity of the artificial reproductive 
process.62 Such an act of reproduction, unlike heterologous techniques, 
occurs fully within the marriage. 
Would such a method of reproduction be considered acceptable? 
The Church's pos ition, based on the unanimity of magisterial statements on 
the subject of artificial reproduction, would certainly be a resounding "No." 
Would such a method be acceptable from within the theological 
community? The answer here is more difficult to gauge. It is suggested 
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that the answer hinges on the acceptabili ty of the c loning process itself. If 
the cloning (of humans) is acknowledged as an ethica lly and morally 
acceptable procedure, then it is like ly that supporter of homo logous 
artificial reproductive techniques would approve of cloning within marriage 
under a few selected circumstances - the rationale be ing that, in such 
s ituations, successful reproduction would bene fit the "goods" of marriage. 
Conversely, if cloning is cons idered morally o r ethically unacceptable, then 
obvious ly it would be considered illi c it in the examples described. 
Within the context of thi s paper, the acceptability o f c loning, in and 
of itself, has not been cons idered. Rather, the purpose has been to re fl ect 
on the reproductive aspects of c loning - ideas which cha llenge wide ly-held 
theological concepts . However, for completeness ' sake, it must be 
mentioned that most Chri sti an theo logians and author , who have written 
on the subject, either oppose or have very serious reservations about the 
acceptability of cloning itse lf.63 As such, the acceptabili ty of cloning as a 
reproductive technique may be a moot po int. However, there still remains 
an inte llectual va lidity to re fl ecting on how the c loning of humans w ill 
challenge our v iews on reproduction. 
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